

mologically related to *trageos* or its cognates, pertaining to goats. Also see the translations of Jowett, Bakewell, Shorey, Sterling and Scott, and Bloom. The Davies and Vaughan translation speaks of the need of human beings to "relish their bread." H. D. P. Lee, consistent with his theory regarding loose translation, has Glaucon complain about Socrates' "pretty plain fare." Cornford has Glaucon complain about Socrates' "feast" on "dry bread." Grube translates *opson* as cooked foods or seasonings, whereas White translates *opsou* at 372C, and presumably elsewhere, as cooked foods or seasonings.

³⁴See W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975), vol. 4, pp. 446-449. Also see James Adam, *The Republic of Plato* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1965), vol. 1, pp. 93, 98-101.

³⁵See Gustav Teichmüller, *Literarische Fehden* (Breslau: Verlag von Wilhelm Koebner, 1884), vol. 2, who details much "direct" evidence from Plato's dialogues in defense of his claim. In the *Republic* he notices the connection between meat-eating and war. In fact, in Socrates' concessions to Glaucon it may be that only soldiers and athletes (as in the *pankration*) are permitted to eat meat, according to Teichmüller, in order to make possible their violent lives. Although Teichmüller rightly notices that the peace of a vegetarian diet is at odds with the violence necessarily entailed in animal slaughter, and although he notices that Plato uses humor to make his point, he does not explicitly cite the two puns that I have treated. Yet it is reasonable to suspect that he noticed them. Moreover, Teichmüller claims that the

case for Plato's vegetarianism gets stronger in the later dialogues, for example in some passages in the *Laws* that I have treated above, and in the *Timaeus* (70D-E, 72E, 77A-C), where the physiology of the human body favors a vegetarian diet. Simple plant foods are always treated positively in the dialogues, but this is not the case regarding animal flesh, despite Nussbaum's view that Plato was uninterested in matters of diet. Further, Teichmüller cites as indirect evidence in favor of his position the aforementioned treatment of cookery (*opsopoiike*) in the *Gorgias*, the condemnation of Thrasymachus' conjunction of might with right, and Plato's inheritance from Pythagoras and other pre-Socratic figures.

³⁶See Julia Annas, *An Introduction to Plato's Republic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1981).

³⁷W. K. C. Guthrie, *A History of Greek Philosophy*, vol. 4.

³⁸See notes 3 and 14 above.

³⁹See Stephen R. L. Clark, "Ancient Philosophy," in Anthony Kenny, ed., *The Oxford Illustrated History of Ancient Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), pp. 53, 380.

⁴⁰Ibid., p. 52.

⁴¹Ibid.

⁴²Nussbaum, "Animal Rights: The Need for a Theoretical Basis," p. 1516. It is interesting that Aristotle's student, Theophrastus, held a quite positive view of animal entitlements. Once again, see Porphyry's *On Abstinence from Killing Animals*, as well as the relevant sections of my *The Philosophy of Vegetarianism* and Sorabji's *Animal Minds and Human Morals*.

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The misconception which has haunted philosophic literature throughout the centuries is the notion of "independent existence." There is no such mode of existence; every entity is only to be understood in terms of the way in which it is interwoven with the rest of the Universe.¹

Perhaps more than any other aspect of his thought, Alfred North Whitehead's rejection of the notion of "independent existence" or substance has been taken to define his philosophy of organism. Moreover, it is this rejection of substances which has been the source of some of the most significant objections to Whitehead's thought. Many commentators often indicate sympathy with Whitehead's project but ask, if the world is composed exclusively of microscopic events which neither endure nor have histories,² then how can Whitehead account for enduring, macroscopic individuals such as ourselves? That is, having rejected the notion of unchanging subjects of change, how can Whitehead's account adequately capture the unity and self-identity of macroscopic individuals?

The contemporary Neo-Thomist W. Norris Clarke³ gives voice to this potentially damaging objection. A close analysis of aspects of Clarke's work will prove rewarding in several respects. Not only does Clarke provide a clear challenge to a non-substantial model of individuality by explicitly formulating and defending the objection that Whitehead's system only allows for an attenuated conception of macroscopic individuality, Clarke's own dynamic interpretation of the classical notion of substance seriously calls into question the very need for Whitehead's "process turn" toward what Clarke sees as a misguided metaphysical atomism.⁴ Thus, engaging Clarke's objection provides a valuable opportunity not only to evaluate the adequacy of his dynamic notion of substance, but also to respond to the common criticism that Whitehead's system does not do justice to the unity of macroscopic individuals.

SUBSTANCE AS DYNAMIC?

In his recent monograph, *The One and the Many*, Clarke traces the source of what he sees as Whitehead's misguided metaphysical atomism to his repudiation of the doctrine of substance. From Clarke's point of view, what is particularly

tragic about this error is that Whitehead's repudiation of substance was itself the result of a flawed understanding of Aristotle and St. Thomas Aquinas' notion of substance.⁵ Clarke has devoted much of his august career to advancing what he calls a "creative retrieval" of St. Thomas which interprets substance dynamically. In contrast to the traditional depiction of substances as independent, unchanging subjects of change, Clarke conceives of every being as inherently active or "self-communicating." According to Clarke, "A non-acting, non-communicating being is for all practical purposes [...] *equivalent* to no being at all. To be *real* is to *make a difference*."⁶ This emphasis on being active and self-communicating also brings Clarke to refute the notion that substances are independent and unrelated. "To have a universe, a community of real existents, its members would have to communicate with each other, be linked together and all communication requires some kind of action."⁷ In fact, Clarke goes so far as to state that a completely unrelated, unchanging entity would not only be "totally pointless," an unchanging entity "could not be the work of a wise creative God. And so we live in a universe where all the real beings that count, that make a difference, are dynamically active ones, that pour over through self-manifesting, self-communicating action to connect up with other real beings, and form a community of interacting existents we call a 'universe.'"⁸ Clearly, this is not the notion of vacuous existence which Whitehead had in mind when he referred to "independent existence" or "substance."

Therefore, far from joining Whitehead in repudiating substance, Clarke steadfastly affirms the supremacy of substance as "the principle of continuity and self-identity throughout the whole spectrum of accidental change open to a particular being."⁹ Clarke is quick to point out, however, that being self-identical is not the same as being unchanging or immutable, as Whitehead, among others, have charged.¹⁰ Clarke reminds his reader that "the authentic meaning of self-identity through change is this: 'In an accidental change, the substance itself changes, but not substantially or essentially, only accidentally.' Thus the subject that changes retains its essential self-identity through the spectrum of accidental change open to it in terms of its natural potencies."¹¹ For Clarke, then, a substance is something which actively maintains self-identity over time, but this self-identity does not signify something which is static or self-enclosed. On the contrary, Clarke insists, "Self-identity is not immutability but the active power of self-maintenance in exchange with others. Thus the best way to maintain psychological self-identity is not by not changing, doing nothing, but by stability of goals, perseveringly pursued."¹² "You could not," Clarke retorts, "find a more dynamic notion [of substance] than this."¹³ In this way, Clarke believes that he can at once affirm the traditional concept of substance as well as capture the dynamic, processive nature of reality in systems such as Whitehead's. Accordingly, given his dynamic interpretation of substance, Clarke seems to be arguing not only that Whitehead's complicated account of process is inadequate, but also that it is unnecessary.

Ironically, just as Clarke finds that Whitehead misinterprets Aristotle and St. Thomas' notion of substance, I believe that, in participating in misleading aspects of what I refer to as the classical interpretation of Whitehead's metaphysics, which, in insisting on a sharp ontological distinction between the past and the present, drains the past of both creativity and value, Clarke misinterprets Whitehead's notion of "society." Thus, before turning to analyze Clarke's "creative retrieval" of the doctrine of substance, let us first examine what I believe are serious flaws in Clarke's interpretation of Whitehead.

In *The One and the Many*, Clarke characterizes Whitehead's system as a metaphysical atomism in which "process itself is made up of many discretely distinct, tiny entities, 'actual occasions' or 'actual entities,' following each other in ordered sequence."¹⁴ Clarke's understanding of Whitehead's account of macroscopic individuals follows directly from this interpretation of process as composed of discrete entities:

The macroscopic objects we call things—plants, animals, humans, chairs, etc.—are really societies or collections of many actual entities bound together by various relations, causal connections etc., existing at any one time. Down through time there is no actual entity that remains the same, unchanged, but only a series of successive entities that we call one being because the series is closely connected by a chain of "inheritance" of properties one from the other. Thus what we call the human "self," the "I," is really only a succession of selves bound together by a common chain of inheritances [...].¹⁵

It is this understanding of Whiteheadian macroscopic objects as "only a series" or "collection" of "discretely distinct" actual entities that brings Clarke to criticize Whitehead's system for not adequately accounting for the experienced unity of macroscopic individuals. Simply stated, Clarke's objection is that a mere succession of entities, no matter how closely connected, could never account for the way we experience ourselves or the way we experience others. As Clarke puts it, a society of "discrete, non-identical selves linked in a temporal and spatial chain is not nearly strong enough to do justice to these powerful experiences of perduring unity and self-identity. [...] The unity of a society, founded on external relations, not on the inner unity of the being itself, is again not strong enough to do justice to the evidenced facts."¹⁶ It is primarily this problem—the unity of macroscopic individuals—which makes Clarke unable to embrace process metaphysics. If correct, this objection would be devastating for a system which strives to be adequate to experience. For if Whitehead is indeed affirming that macroscopic individuals

are merely a succession of "selves," he would be unable to account for the unity of our own experience and of our experience of others. The question, then, is whether Whitehead's organic model of individuality is able to do justice to the "evidenced facts."

Given that Clarke recognizes that Whitehead's emphasis on interrelatedness is "one of the most fertile of all the Whiteheadian insights into what it means to be in our world,"¹⁷ it is surprising that he characterizes process as being "made up of many *discretely distinct*, tiny entities [...]"¹⁸ Though it is true that Whitehead believes that experience comes in "drops" and that, in a sense, actual occasions are the atomic stuff of which the universe is made, it is important also to recall that this atomism is *not* purchased at the expense of the unity of the universe. The relations obtaining between actual occasions are primarily internal, not external, wherein these internal relations "are constitutive of what the event is in itself."¹⁹ Each actual occasion is, in this sense, its relationship to the universe. Hence, for Whitehead, the concept of individuality (both macroscopic and microscopic) itself requires *essential reference to others*. This emphasis upon interrelation and interdependence is what is meant by referring to Whitehead's model of individuality as "organic." Furthermore, it is in this way that Whitehead sees himself explicitly rejecting Aristotle's dictum, which Clarke affirms, that a substance is never present in another. Indeed, according to Whitehead's principle of relativity, "an actual entity *is* present in other actual entities. In fact, if we allow for degrees of relevance, and for negligible relevance, we must say that every actual entity is present in every other actual entity."²⁰ Given that every actual occasion is present in every other, actual occasions are anything but "discretely distinct," as Clarke contends. As a matter of fact, given the principle of relativity, they are more nearly the opposite.

Given the constitutive relation between societies and actual occasions, the proper understanding of the latter as organically interrelated has a significant impact on how to conceive of the former. Clarke, incorrectly, I contend, depicts a society as "an *aggregate* of many *distinct* beings held together in an *extrinsic* unity based on *external* relations."²¹ Yet, this interpretation of Whitehead's concept of "society" is incorrect on virtually every point. A society is not an "aggregate" of "discrete," "externally related" beings held together in an "extrinsic unity." Rather, a society is a *socially ordered* nexus of *internally* related occasions which form an *intrinsic* unity. Societies are *not* mere collections or aggregates of entities to which the same class-name applies. This is the difference between a nexus and a society. Whereas a nexus is simply any real fact of togetherness, including extrinsic or aggregative unities such as boulders and mountains, a society is a particular type of nexus which enjoys "social order." That is, a society's constituent occasions share a common, defining characteristic because of the conditions imposed upon them by their *internal* relatedness with previous members of that self-same society. Hence, contrary to aggregate entities, complex, struc-

tured societies such as plants and animals are organic entities which, like systematic entities, are characterized by strong internal relations which make possible a regnant unity.

This intimate relationship between a macroscopic whole and its parts brings to light a crucial difference in the role of "interrelation" in Clarke and Whitehead's respective systems. Whereas, for Whitehead, the relations between individuals are constitutive of their very character, for Clarke, although it is essential to the nature of substances that they be related to "some other beings and systems of them," it is merely "accidental to which particular beings and systems [they] are related."²² That is, although, according to Clarke, every substance or real being is nested within and depends upon various kinds of order or systems, which others and which systems a substance is or is not related to is purely accidental; that is, it does not affect its essence. For Whitehead, on the other hand, in a sense, every individual just is its relationships to every element in its world. Though some relations may be more central in the constitution of an entity than others, there are no purely accidental relationships. Thus, although he may affirm a notion of substance as being in dynamic interrelation with its environment, insofar as these interrelations are only external and accidental to what that substance is, Clarke still adheres to the notion of "independent existence," which, according to Whitehead, is the "misconception which has haunted philosophic literature throughout the centuries [...]"²³

Hence, I find that Clarke is incorrect in his interpretation both of process as involving discrete entities and of societies as collections of externally related entities. Far from being "discretely distinct," actual occasions are in fact constituted by their internal relations with others. Similarly, rather than being mere "extrinsic unities" composed of "collections" or "aggregates" of "externally related" entities, societies are intrinsic unities of socially ordered actual occasions which, by reason of the conditions imposed upon them by their *internal* relatedness to previous members of the society, share a common characteristic (what has traditionally been called the essential form).²⁴

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Both of these misinterpretations, I suspect, derive in large part from Clarke's misunderstanding of why Whitehead felt compelled to reject the doctrine of substance. While he is correct that, at least in part, Whitehead developed his metaphysics of process in response to the inadequacies he perceived in substance ontologies, Clarke is mistaken when he further claims that Whitehead's motivation was primarily to "banish any notion of a unitary subject perduring through

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time.”²⁵ The mistake which Clarke and many others make is to assume that Whitehead denies that we experience the world in terms of substantial, perduring individuals. Yet, this is clearly incorrect.

With Clarke, Whitehead fully recognizes that it is unavoidable and even important that the human mind think of things in terms of substance and quality.²⁶ For, he says in *Science and the Modern World*, “without these ways of thinking we could not get our ideas straight for daily use.”²⁷ Things such as tables, dogs, and roses are not fictions, nor do their forms of order derive from the functioning of our minds. Rather, Whitehead’s claim is that part of what it is to be the type of high-grade organism that we are is to have the ability to abstract from, as James put it, the “booming buzzing confusion” which constantly confronts us.²⁸ For Whitehead, our experience of the world, indeed the experience of most animals, is the product of a complex physiological process which has as its primary function the attention to a focal foreground purchased at the expense of a massive, neglected background. “There are other elements in our experience, on the fringe of consciousness, and yet massively qualifying our experience. In regard to these other facts, it is our consciousness that flickers, and not the facts themselves. They are always securely there, barely discriminated, and yet inescapable.”²⁹ Consequently, Whitehead claims, if we look closely at the concepts of substance and quality we will find that they are essentially “elaborate logical constructions of a high degree of abstraction.”³⁰ They are complicated and highly useful abstractions, but they are abstractions nonetheless. Thus, the problem is not the fact that we perceive the world in terms of substantial individuals—this is both unavoidable and practically important—but that we fail to *recognize* “that we are presenting ourselves with simplified editions of immediate matters of fact.”³¹ This inappropriate substitution of the abstract for the concrete is the essence of what Whitehead calls the “fallacy of misplaced concreteness.”³² Ultimately, Whitehead explains, the violation of this fallacy does not result from the mere employment of the word “substance,” but from taking, whether consciously or unconsciously, independence rather than interconnection as ontologically ultimate.³³ What Whitehead denies, then, is not the unity of macroscopic individuals, but the notion that these macroscopic, perduring individuals are the most basic ontological units of explanation. Accordingly, I contend that the question which is at stake is not whether Whitehead seeks to “banish” the idea of perduring individuality, which he does not, but rather *how* perduring individuality is to be explained.

It may be helpful to formulate this claim by means of Bernard Lonergan’s distinction between description and explanation,³⁴ to which Clarke himself subscribes.³⁵ According to Lonergan, a description differs from an explanation in that a description derives from relating objects of inquiry to the percipient, whereas an explanation derives from relating objects of inquiry to one another. For instance, while a descriptive account of a sunrise, by relating the data to the percipient, would claim that the sun literally rises over a stationary earth, an explanatory

account, by relating the data to each other, would claim that the sun appears to rise because the earth rotates on its axis around the sun.

Taken in these terms, Whitehead is rejecting substance as an adequate explanation of the nature of things, not as an adequate *description*. Hence, I contend that it is Clarke’s account of experience in terms of substantial, perduring individuals which is insufficiently explanatory because it arrives at its most basic ontological units—i.e., macroscopic, perduring individuals—by means of the way the world appears to us (humans). To put this in Whiteheadian terms, this would be to say that, in taking our perception of the world as delineating the most basic ontological units, substance ontology violates the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. “It is the mistake that has thwarted European metaphysics from the time of the Greeks, namely, to confuse societies with the completely real things which are the actual occasions.”³⁶ Beyond this criticism, which applies to substance ontologies in general, there is an additional way in which Clarke’s dynamic account of substance is uniquely lacking in explanatory force.

For if Clarke is to truly avoid the conception of substance as a static cabinet of accidental changes, if active self-maintenance is not achieved by “not changing, doing nothing,” then it is incumbent upon him to give an *explanation*, not just a description, of how this active self-maintenance takes place.³⁷ For Whitehead, it is not sufficient simply to say that substance or essential form just is that principle which provides unity and links the accidental attributes of a being. What is needed, I submit, is an *explanation* of *how* the active maintenance of self-identity takes place from moment to moment. Furthermore, I contend that in order to do so, Clarke must ultimately appeal to some doctrine of internal relations. For if an individual is not essentially the same by *not* changing, but by changing at each moment, by actively responding to changing circumstances in its environment, then at each successive moment, from the time of its creation until its destruction, its self-identity must be continually reaffirmed. Unfortunately, Clarke is lacking any such account of how this active reassertion of a given character at each successive moment takes place. It is just because self-identity must be continually reasserted and maintained that the fact of the internal relatedness of each moment to the one before it cannot be taken for granted. As a practical demonstration of the greater explanatory power of Whitehead’s organic model over Clarke’s, I propose that we briefly examine the ontological status of systems in each.

Having the benefit of the extensive advances in fields such as ecology and biology, Clarke recognizes that he must break with Aristotle and St. Thomas and affirm that a system is

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a new mode of unity existing between and binding together individual substances, which is not merely the sum of many different accidental relations but forms a *new unity* with its own properties that is not reducible merely to the sum of all the individual relations, but is a new mode of unity that resides in all the members at once.³⁸

Quite rightly, Clarke recognizes that “things” such as ecosystems are not simply aggregates of externally related substances. A system is a mode of unity with properties of its own. However, this introduces a problem for Clarke. While systems have properties of their own and, therefore, are more than a mere aggregate of entities, they have insufficient unity to be considered a substance in their own right. Within his system, it simply is invalid to claim that a system is “partially” or “sort of” a substance; something is either a substance or it is not. Given the constraints of his substance ontology, Clarke takes the only option open to him. Namely, he argues that a system “belongs to the order of accidents, but it is a unique kind of accident that inheres in many subjects at once—a form of one-in-many—and so deserves a name of its own because of its special properties.”³⁹ Unfortunately, I think that Clarke is appealing to a distinction which, in fact, makes no difference; referring to systems as a type of accident, even a unique type, cannot do justice to the real form of unity which a system is.

Interestingly, Clarke flirts with a model very similar to the one being defended when he examines systems which so strongly dominate their constituents that their individuality becomes almost submerged or wiped out, e.g., the ants in an ant colony or bees in a beehive are so powerfully governed by the “psychic field” of the whole that they surrender themselves instinctively and totally to the good of the whole, and will die soon if removed from it, even though they have adequate food, water, etc. The system has almost totally absorbed them; it so dominates them that they can be almost said to compose one being, but not quite.⁴⁰

What is particularly noteworthy is that Clarke has his finger on the difference between a structured living society and a personally ordered, structured, living society. For Whitehead, it is the dominance of a single, serially ordered, continuous society that governs its structured society that characterizes human experience. Whereas, on Clarke’s model of substance, such a relation is problematic, for Whitehead, it is simply a matter of analyzing the types of order achieved by a particular nexus of actual occasions. For in an organic philosophy such as Whitehead’s, macroscopic individuality is a matter of order. If the degree of order is particularly high and novelty is introduced, then it is a living society. If it is higher still it may be a personal society. The question, then, is not *whether* a particular form of order is or is not a substance, as it is for Clarke. Though systems, such as ecosystems, may not have the same degree of intrinsic unity as a plant or animal, for instance, they are nonetheless a real form of togetherness with properties of their own. By taking only the macroscopic units which we perceive at our

scale of experience as the ontologically basic units, Clarke is unable to affirm the notion that there are degrees of coordination each of which is a real form of togetherness.⁴¹ Thus, I believe that it is Clarke who must ultimately make the process turn if he is to truly *explain*, not merely describe, the fact of dynamic self-identity.

This conclusion brings to light the very important difference between the classical notion of essential form and Whitehead’s notion of defining characteristic. Whereas, according to the tradition, the essential form imposes and is the *cause* of the unity and self-identity of a substance by imposing its activity, as it were, from “above,” for Whitehead, the defining characteristic *arises out* of the mutual immanence of the genetically related nexus of actual occasions which comprise a society. For Clarke, the essential form is “that central unifying force in a material being that binds all its elements together into an intrinsic unity of being and action, not a mere aggregate. It functions as the abiding center of characteristic actions [...]”⁴² However, for Whitehead, the defining characteristic of a society is, as Joseph Bracken puts it, “derived moment by moment from the genetic inter-relatedness of the actual occasions making up a given society [...]”⁴³ The defining characteristic provides the environment which makes possible a higher degree of functioning, but it is the actual occasions which actually perpetuate the defining characteristic. In the final analysis, then, I believe that this affords the organic model a decided advantage over the doctrine of substance.

Whereas for the substance model of individuality it is a mystery *how* a substance’s essential form ultimately gives it unity in the present and over time, the organic model has a further level of explanation available to it. Namely, the unity of macroscopic individuals arises out of the intense, organic interrelation and coordination of actual occasions.⁴⁴ In this way, the organic model is better able to *explain* the unity of experience which perduring macroscopic individuals possess. Thus, I submit that the most basic difference between Whitehead and Clarke’s systems is ultimately found in the level of explanation open to each. Whereas Clarke’s system stops with macroscopic agents, Whitehead’s system pushes on to provide an account of how macroscopic agency arises and how it is perpetuated. In this way, Whitehead’s organic model not only meets the challenge of providing an adequate account of the experienced unity of macroscopic individuals, but it does so with greater explanatory depth. In the end, then, if he is truly to *explain*, not merely describe, his own notion of substance as dynamic self-identity, I believe that Clarke must ultimately make the “process turn.”

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¹Alfred North Whitehead, "Immortality" in *The Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead*. Edited by Paul Arthur Schilpp, 2nd ed. (LaSalle: Open Court, 1951) 687.

²Cf. "[A]n actual occasion has no [...] history. It never changes it only becomes and perishes. Its perishing is its assumption of a new metaphysical function in the creative advance of the universe" Alfred North Whitehead, *Adventure of Ideas* (New York: Free Press, 1933) 204.

³It is with the utmost respect and appreciation that I engage the work of Fr. Clarke, whom I was honored to have on my dissertation committee at Fordham University (2003).

⁴Clarke also objects to Whitehead's conception of God and its relation to creativity. However, this objection does not concern the present investigation directly. See "God and the Community of Existents: Whitehead and St. Thomas," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 158 (2000): 266-68.

⁵For an extended discussion of this point see James Felt, "Whitehead's Misconception of 'Substance' in Aristotle," *Process Studies* 14 (1985): 224-236.

⁶W. Norris Clarke, *The One and The Many* (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 2001) 32; author's emphases.

⁷*Ibid.*, 32.

⁸*Ibid.*, 33.

⁹*Ibid.*, 129.

¹⁰Cf. "In a word, *self-identity and immutability* are not at all identical or interchangeable concepts. The self-identity of a real being is not a static, immutable 'thing' but more like an abiding force that actively assimilates and integrates all of the less-than-substantial changes which it undergoes: a unity-identity-whole that maintains itself within certain flexible limits; when these are breached, the identity collapses" (Clarke, "God and Community" 272, author's emphases).

¹¹Clarke, *The One and The Many* 128.

¹²*Ibid.*, 129.

¹³*Ibid.*

¹⁴*Ibid.*, 102.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 125.

¹⁶Clarke, "God and Community" 268.

¹⁷*Ibid.*, 276.

¹⁸Clarke, *The One and the Many* 102, emphasis added.

¹⁹Alfred North Whitehead, *Science and the Modern World* (New York: Free Press 1925) 104.

²⁰Alfred North Whitehead, *Process and Reality* (Corrected Edition), Edited by David

Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne (New York: Free Press, 1978) 50.

²¹Clarke, "God and Community" 271, emphases added.

²²Clarke, *The One and The Many* 136.

²³Whitehead, "Immortality" 687.

²⁴I explicitly examine the similarity between a society's defining characteristic and the classical notion of essential or substantial form more fully below.

²⁵Clarke, "God and Community" 269.

²⁶Whitehead, *Science* 52.

²⁷*Ibid.*

²⁸As Whitehead puts it, "We find ourselves in a buzzing world, amid a democracy of fellow creatures; whereas, under some guise or other, orthodox philosophy can only introduce us to solitary substances, each enjoying an illusory experience: 'O Bottom, thou art changed! What do I see on thee?'" (Whitehead, *Process* 50).

²⁹Whitehead, *Adventures* 163.

³⁰Whitehead, *Science* 52. See also, "The simple notion of an enduring substance sustaining persistent qualities, either essentially or accidentally, expresses a useful abstract for many purposes in life. But whenever we try to use it as a fundamental statement of the nature of things, it proves itself mistaken. It arose from a mistake and has never succeeded in any of its applications. But it has had one success: it has entrenched itself in language, in Aristotelian logic, and in metaphysics. For its employment in language and in logic, there is—as stated above—a sound pragmatic defence. But in metaphysics the concept is sheer error" (Whitehead, *Process* 79). Also, "This error [of a vacuous substratum] is the result of high-grade intellectuality. The instinctive interpretations which govern human life and animal life presuppose a contemporary world throbbing with energetic values" (Whitehead, *Adventures* 219).

³¹Whitehead, *Science* 52.

³²Cf. Whitehead, *Science* 51-53, 58.

³³Cf. Whitehead, *Process* 79.

³⁴See Bernard Lonergan, *Insight: A Study of Human Understanding* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1992) 418, 562.

³⁵Cf. Clarke, *The One and the Many* 18-19.

³⁶Whitehead, *Adventures* 204.

³⁷In the following passage from *Adventures of Ideas*, Whitehead eloquently captures the challenge which is at stake: "consider our derivation from our immediate past of a quarter of a second ago. We are continuous with it, we are the same

as it, prolonging its affective tone, enjoying its data. And yet we are modifying it, deflecting it, changing its purposes, altering its tone, re-conditioning its data with new elements. We reduce this past to a perspective, and yet retain it as the basis of our present moment of realization. We are different from it, and yet we retain our individual identity with it. This is the mystery of personal identity, the mystery of the immanence of the past in the present, the mystery of transcendence [sic]" (163).

³⁸Clarke, *The One and The Many* 135, author's emphasis. See also, "What is a system? It is a set of relations forming a new unified order, or 'togetherness,' being-together (*mit-sein* in German), which has its own set of properties as a system and influences its members accordingly" (*Ibid.*, 136).

³⁹*Ibid.*, 136.

⁴⁰*Ibid.*, 136-7.

⁴¹In a passage from his essay "God and the Community of Existents," Clarke gets surprisingly close to the interpretation being advanced. Rather than simply affirming something as having sufficient unity to be a substance or not a substance, Clarke advances the idea that an essential form can have greater or lesser degree of control over its parts. "The ontological unity of living beings is not just a static state, either given univocally or not, but an active achievement, an ongoing act of cohering achieved by the energy and power of the central form. And

there seems to be a spectrum of degrees of control of the form over its parts: certain basic ones are firmly under the control of the form; others, for various reasons, show a little more resistance to orders from above [...]. The unity of real material beings turns out to be complex, changing in intensity—in a word, messy—and needs a flexible theory of degrees of unity to do justice to it" (272). In the end, however, this does not help him with the question as to the ontological status of systems. For Clarke is considering the degree of control exercised by an essential form, again from above, as it were, rather than the degree of coordination of the parts which brings about a form of a particular type. Thus, even with this model he still is only talking about degrees of control by the substance, rather than allowing for a level of explanation more basic than the macroscopic level of the essential form.

⁴²Clarke, *The One and The Many* 102.

⁴³Joseph A. Bracken, *Society and Spirit: A Trinitarian Cosmology* (London: Associated University Presses, 1991) 111.

⁴⁴Cf. "The organic starting point is from the analysis of process as the realization of events disposed in an interlocking community. The event is the unit of things real. The emergent enduring pattern is the stabilization of the emergent achievement so as to become a fact which retains its identity throughout the process" (Whitehead, *Science* 152).

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